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HIV-INFECTED SURGICAL PERSONNEL
UNDER THE ADA: DO THEY POSE A DIRECT




The Americans with Disabilities Act of 19901 (ADA) has been her-
alded as a watershed in the fight for equal treatment of disabled peo-
ple. Among other things, the ADA and its predecessor companion
statute, the Rehabilitation Act of 19733 (Rehabilitation Act), prohibits
employers from discriminating against an employee based upon a real
or perceived disability of that employee.4 Within the ambit of "dis-
abilities" protected by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, courts and
relevant administrative agencies recognize the Acquired Immune De-
ficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and its cause, the Human Immunodefi-
ciency Virus (HIV). Thus, the ADA has significant implications for
HIV-positive workers in many fields. Key among these fields is the
health care industry. The specter of tainted blood and infected workers
transmitting the virus to patients looms large on the health care hori-
zon. 6 Because of the deadly nature of HIV, many people are justifiably
Attorney, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C.; J.D., 1999, Drake
University Law School; B.A., 1996, Drake University. The author would
like to thank James Albert and Keith Miller, Professors of Law, for their in-
spiration and guidance in developing this article.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. See 136 Cong. Rec. S9689 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of
Senator Harkin).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1994).
4. See Patricia M. Bailey, Note, "Significant Risk" Concept Justifies
Practice Restrictions of an HIV-Infected Surgeon, Scoles v. Mercy Health
Corp., 40 VILL. L. REv. 687, 687-88 (1995).
5. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2213 (1998).
6. See R. Bradley Prewitt, Comment, The "Direct Threat" Approach to
the HIV-Positive Health Care Employee Under the ADA, 62 MISS. L.J. 719,
722-23 (1992) (discussing the danger of HIV in the health care industry).
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concerned about HIV infection in the event they must accept health
care. A key issue challenging courts today is: what steps can the health
care employer take to alleviate or lessen the risks that an HIV-infected
employee poses to a patient without violating that employee's rights
under federal disability law.
7
Many cases and articles have been written covering the risks of
HIV-positive health care workers (HCWs) in various employment po-
sitions. 8 This Article specifically focuses on the legal risks involved
with HIV-positive HCWs who perform invasive surgical procedures.
Of course, given the inherently invasive nature of surgical work, sur-
gical HCWs who are HIV-positive pose a higher risk of infecting pa-
tients than other HCWs.9 This analysis involves balancing three inter-
ests: the rights of the HIV-positive HCW, the considerations of liabil-
ity and safety for the employer health care provider, and the rights and
safety of the patients. This Article addresses how the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act, in theory, reconcile these competing interests and
how the courts are interpreting the statutes to balance them.10
Part II of this Article discusses the applicable statutory provisions
of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to paint the background for inter-
pretative case law." Part III examines how courts are analyzing the
statutory provisions in light of the issues specifically raised by HCWs
in the operating room. 12 This Part of the analysis includes a brief ex-
amination of guidelines promulgated by public health authorities. 13 Fi-
nally, this Article concludes by noting the discrepancies in the analysis
used by various courts when faced with a situation involving an HIV-
positive surgical HCW and how these discrepancies may be in conflict
with the Supreme Court's guidance.
14
7. See infra Part III (discussing the statutory provisions and interpretative
case law relating to the disability protection of HIV-positive individuals).
8. See, e.g., Prewitt, supra note 6, at 722-23.
9. See, e.g., Mary Anne Bobinski, Risk and Rationality: The Centers for
Disease Control and Regulation of HIV-Infected Health Care Workers, 36 ST.
Louis U.. L.J. 213, 226-29 (1991) (discussing guidelines for HIV-positive
HCWs in performing invasive procedures).
10. See infra Parts iI-III.
11. See infra Part I1.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part IV.
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I. HIV, HCWs AND DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
The ADA has had a major impact on hospitals and other health care
institutions and organizations.' 5 Similarly, AIDS, a disability under the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, has had a major impact on health
care providers. In 1992, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) re-
ported that 8,467 HCWs were diagnosed with AIDS.16 Of these, sixty-
one were surgeons, 872 were other physicians, 3,383 were nurses and
aides, and 1,098 were technicians. 17 One can only speculate that in
1999, given the trends over thie last several years in the spread of HIV,
these numbers will continue to rise.' 8 Therefore, the ADA and the Re-
habilitation Act offer perhaps the only effective federal remedy to ad-
dress this situation. 9
The ADA was enacted as a wide-ranging remedial statute designed
to eliminate the ills of discrimination against the forty-three million
Americans Congress identified as disabled. 20 Title I of the ADA spe-
cifically relates to employment situations involving disabled persons. 21
Under Title I, no employer may "discriminate against a qualified indi-
vidual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard" to virtually all aspects of the employer/employee relationship,
including hiring.22 The general rule, while facially clear in scope and
15. See Katherine Benesch, AIDS and the ADA in the Health Care Work-
place, 23 BRIEF 22, 22 (1994). It should be noted that the ADA's coverage
must be construed at least as broadly as that of the Rehabilitation Act. See 42
U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994).
16. See Benesch, supra note 15, at 24.
17. See id.
18. Indeed, given the fact that the 1992 CDC report looked only at those
HCWs with "AIDS," one can safely assume that these figures do not include
HIV-positive individuals that had not yet manifested the signs required to be
classified as having AIDS. Thus, the numbers of HCWs who could potentially
pose a risk to patients and fellow HCWs is likely much higher than those pro-
vided above.
19. The focus of this part of this Article is the ADA. Because the ADA
covers private entities, unlike the Rehabilitation Act, it arguably has a broader
reach. However, the analysis regarding the issues addressed in this Article is
identical under either statute largely due to the fact that the ADA simply in-
corporates much of the Rehabilitation Act's language and analysis. See Brag-
don, 118 S. Ct. at 2202 (1998).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
21. See id. §§ 12111-12117.
22. Id. § 12112(a).
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application, is subject to a maze of definitions and exceptions. Of par-
ticular importance to the scope of this Article are the meaning and ap-
plication of the terms "discriminate" and "qualified individual with a
disability.
23
A person is considered disabled under the ADA if any one of three
conditions are met.24 First, the individual is disabled if he or she suf-
fers from a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual. 25 Second,
an individual is disabled if there is "a record of such an impairment. 2 6
Finally, an individual is considered disabled under the ADA if an em-
ployer regards him or her as having an impairment, even if she actu-
ally does not suffer from one.
27
A "qualified individual with a disability" is a disabled person who,
"with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that [the disabled person] holds
or desires. '28 Thus, if a person is so disabled that an employer cannot
reasonably accommodate the disability, then that person is not "quali-
fied" for protection under Title I of the ADA. Similarly, if the individ-
ual possesses a disability that poses a direct threat to others, that indi-
vidual is likewise not "qualified., 29 A "direct threat" is defined by the
ADA as "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot
be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. 30
An employer discriminates against a qualified disabled employee
when the employer fails to make "reasonable accommodations" for
any known impairments of the employee.3 ' The employer can be re-
23. Id. § 12111.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)
25. Id. § 12102(2)(A).
26. Id. § 12102(2)(B).
27. See id. § 12102(2)(C).
28. 42 U.S.C. §12111(8).
29. Id. §12111 (3).
30. Id. "Direct threat" is the term used by the ADA. "Significant risk" is
used by the Rehabilitation Act, and by the ADA in its definition of "direct
threat." Both terms mean the same and are analyzed the same. Compare
School Bd of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1986) with 28
C.F.R. § 36.208 (1998) (utilizing the same analysis for both the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA regarding direct threat and significant risk).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). "Reasonable accommodation" is defined
by the ADA to include such things as: making employment facilities accessi-
ble and usable for disabled individuals; special training; job restructuring;
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lieved of the burden of making the accommodation (i.e., the accom-
modation becomes unreasonable) if the employer demonstrates that
the "accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the opera-
,,32tion of the business....
II. ARE HIV-POSITIVE SURGICAL HEALTH CARE WORKERS
ENTITLED TO STATUTORY PROTECTION AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION BY THEIR EMPLOYERS?
The legislative history pre-dating passage of the ADA clearly dem-
onstrates Congress' intent to protect individuals classified as HIV-
positive. 3 In turn, the Rehabilitation Act also extended protection to
cover HIV-positive individuals. 34 Furthermore, the Supreme Court re-
cently recognized that an individual with asymptomatic HIV is con-
sidered "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA. 35 However, an
modifying the work schedule; reassignment; acquisition of special equipment;
and "other similar accommodations." Id. § 12111(9).
32. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). "Undue hardship" is defined
by the ADA as "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when
considered in light of' several factors set forth in the statute. Id. § 12111(10).
Those factors include:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under [the
DA];
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities in-
volved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the
number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on ex-
penses and resources, or impact otherwise of such accommo-
dation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the [employer]" the overall
size of the business ... with respect to the number of its employ-
ees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the [employer], includ-
ing the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce...
the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship
of the ficility or ficilities in question....
Id.
33. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(11), at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334 ("[A] person. infected with [HIV] is covered under the
first prong of the definition of the term 'disability' because of a substantial
limitation on procreation and intimate sexual relationships."); 28 C.F.R. §
36.104 (1998) (listing HIV as a physical or mental impairment under the stat-
ute).
34. See Bailey, supra note 4, at 688-89.
35. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2208-09. The Bragdon court addressed
whether an individual with asymptomatic HIV had an impairment that sub-
stantially limited a major life activity. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)
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HIV-positive individual whose condition meets the statutory definition
of disability 36 is not automatically entitled to statutory protection. As
noted above,37 if an individual is so disabled that he or she cannot
work, even with reasonable accommodation, the individual is not
qualified under the ADA.38 Additionally, if the individual, as an em-
ployee, poses a direct threat or significant risk to the safety of the
working environment, then the individual does not qualify for protec-
tion under the ADA. 39 Finally, if an individual could work with an ac-
commodation from his employer, but that accommodation places an
undue hardship upon the employer, then the individual is likewise not
qualified for statutory protection.40
A. HIV and the Direct Threat/Significant Risk Analysis
The ADA defines a "direct threat" as "a significant risk to the
health and safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable ac-
commodation." 41 Congress designed this definition to codify the Su-
preme Court's four-factor test set forth in School Board of Nassau
County v. Arline,42 a 1986 case decided under the Rehabilitation Act.
43
Under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, the analysis of
whether there is a direct threat or significant risk is identical: an indi-
(1994) (defining "disabled" under the ADA). Other courts have recognized
that an individual who has HIV also meets the statutory definition of being
disabled. See Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Delaware, 924 F. Supp.
763, 777 (E.D. Tex. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2) (B) (stating that an
individual is disabled if the individual has a record of a disability). An indi-
vidual who does not have HIV, but is regarded has having it by his employer,
could also fall within the ADA's definition of disability. See 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(C) (stating that an individual who is "regarded as" disabled is enti-
tled to protection if the other relevant elements of the ADA are met).
36. The definition of disability is the same for the ADA and the Rehabili-
tation Act. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202.
37. See supra Part II (discussing the elements of statutory disability pro-
tection).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
39. See id.; see also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing
the definition of a direct threat/significant risk).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3).
42. 480 U.S. 273 (1986).
43. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210 (noting that the ADA's direct threat
provision codifies Arline) (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 26, App. B., 626 (1997)).
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vidual whose disability poses a direct threat or significant risk of harm
to others is not qualified for protection under either statute.
44
A court's decision of whether a direct threat or significant risk ex-
ists requires balancing the Arline factors. 45 In Arline, the Supreme
Court held that an individual afflicted with a contagious disease could
be "disabled" under the Rehabilitation Act if the required prima facie
elements of the Act were met.46 The Arline Court established that
whether a disabled individual poses a direct threat or significant risk
depends upon weighing four factors based on the current state of
medical knowledge:
(1) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted);
(2) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious);
(3) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third
parties); and
(4) the probab[ility] that the disease will be transmitted and will
cause varying degrees of harm.47
In assessing these factors, the Court noted that significant deference
should be given to the "reasonable medical judgment of public health
officials," such as the guidance given by the CDC.48 Further, the Court
held that even if a weighing of the four factors concludes that an indi-
vidual poses a significant risk to others, it does not mean reasonable
accommodation on the part of the employer is impossible.49 The fac-
tors involved in determining if reasonable accommodation is possible
are different from those considered in analyzing whether there is a di-
rect threat.50
1. Case Law Interpreting Arline and Direct Threat/Significant Risk
Courts faced with a claim of employer discrimination based upon an
44. See Bailey, supra note 4, at 688-90.
45. See id. at 698-705.
46. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 289.
47. Id. at 288.
48. Id.
49. See id. Likewise, the ADA states that an employee is not a direct
threat and not prohibited by the statutes, if the employer cab reasonably ac-
commodate the disability to substantially alleviate the threat to others that the
disability imposes. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12113(3), (9).
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employee's.HIV status have not uniformly applied the Arline analysis.
In situations not involving HIV-positive HCWs, courts have almost
uniformly given equal weight to all four of the Arline factors, includ-
ing risk of transmission.5 In such cases, the courts almost always find
no direct threat or significant risk, thus concluding that the employee
is entitled to protection under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.52 A dif-
ferent analysis has also developed in cases involving HIV-positive
HCWs, particularly those whose job descriptions include performing
or assisting with some sort of invasive procedure. 3 In such situations,
courts tend to give uneven weight to the Arline factors by de-
emphasizing the fourth prong, which evaluates the risk of transmis-
sion, in favor of finding that the worker poses a direct threat or sig-
nificant risk and thus, is not qualified for statutory protection. 4
2. Courts Equally Balancing All Four of the Arline Factors
In Chalk v. United States District Court,55 the Ninth Circuit closely
followed the Supreme Court's analysis established in Arline. In Chalk,
a school administrator reassigned a school teacher, diagnosed with
AIDS, 5 6 to an administrative position and barred him from teaching in
the classroom. 7 The teacher subsequently filed a complaint, alleging
that such an action violated the Rehabilitation Act while also request-
ing an injunction against the school administrators.5 8 The district court
denied the plaintiff's request for an injunction on the grounds that he
constituted a significant risk to the school children because he had
AIDS.5 9
In reversing the district court's denial of the injunction, the Ninth
Circuit court utilized the Arline four-factor approach to determine
whether the plaintiff presented a significant risk.60 The court accorded
equal weight to all four factors in concluding that no significant risk
51. See infra Part I1I.A.l.a.
52. See infra Part III.A. 1.a.
53. See infra Part III.A. 1.b.
54. See infra Part III.A. 1.b.
55. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
56. See id. at 703.
57. See id.
58. See id
59. See id. at 705.
60. See 840 F.2d at 705.
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existed.6' In so concluding, the court carefully examined the fourth
prong of the Arline test and noted the overwhelming weight of credi-
ble medical evidence demonstrating the minimal risk of transmission
through casual contact between HIV-positive individuals and non-
infected individuals.62
Other courts have accepted the Chalk analysis, requiring that the
risk of transmission be significant to justify disparate treatment of
HIV-positive individuals.63
The Eleventh Circuit in Onishea v. Hopper64 recently declared that
all four factors of the Arline test should be given due consideration.65
The court stated that the Arline test required "a significant risk of HIV
transmission before sanctioning" 66 any sort of discriminatory behavior
against an HIV-positive individual.67 Even though the threat of HIV
transmission poses a risk to a non-infected individual in virtually any
setting, the court held that the risk must be significant before any dis-
crimination would be allowed. 68 The court concluded that both Arline
and congressional intent required the acceptance of some risks under
the disability discrimination statutes to prohibit employers from "un-
duly indulging [in] their fears."
61. See id. at 705-09.
62. See id. at 706-08.
63. In Doe v. Dolton Elementary School District No. 148, 694 F. Supp.
440, 445-46 (N.D. I11. 1988), the district court held that an HIV-positive stu-
dent, who was threatened with removal from the classroom, was entitled to an
injunction where medical evidence showed no significant risk of HIV trans-
mission in school. In New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc.
v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979), the Second Circuit, in a pre-Arline de-
cision, applied a "significant transmission risk" standard, virtually identical to
the fourth Arline prong. Id. at 650. The court found that hepatitis B-infected
students posed less than a significant risk to other students, and thus were en-
titled to protection under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. This decision has direct
application to cases involving HIV, as hepatitis B has identical transmission
pathways as HIV. See Onishea v. Hopper, 126 F.3d 1323, 1332 (1 1th Cir.
1997).
64. Onishea, 126 F.3d at 1323.
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3. Courts De-Emphasizing the Probability of Transmission Factor
of Arline
While some courts emphasize that all four of the Arline factors must
be given equal weight, other courts conclude that probability of trans-
mission, based on medical testimony, need not be significant to sup-
port a finding of disparate treatment. 69 This re-balancing of the Arline
factors is especially evident in cases involving HIV-positive surgical
HCWs. Even though there has never been a documented case of HIV
being transmitted to a patient by an HIV-positive surgical HCW,
courts have concluded the other Arline factors, such as the severity
and nature of the risk, outweigh the probability of transmission. 0
A seminal case involving HIV-positive surgical HCWs and the de-
termination of disability under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act is
Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation." In this
case, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of whether an HIV-
infected neurosurgeon posed a significant risk or direct threat to his
patients, and thus, whether or not the doctor qualified for statutory
protection. 72 Ironically, the surgeon-plaintiff became infected with
HIV after being stuck with a needle while treating an HIV-positive
73patient.
The Doe court directly utilized the Arline analysis to resolve
whether the plaintiff posed a significant risk, thereby removing the
plaintiff from statutory protection.74 However, the court concluded that
the Arline factors "discount[] the severity of anticipated harms by the
statistical probability that they will occur."75 After a detailed evalua-
tion of the authoritative CDC guidelines regarding HIV-positive surgi-
cal HCWs, the court concluded that the doctor posed a significant risk
to his patients.76 The court reached this conclusion even after finding
that, according to the CDC, not all procedures employed by neurosur-
geons are "exposure-prone," and that the statistical probability of sur-
69. See infra notes 72-105 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 72-105 and accompanying text.
71. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
72. See id. at 1262.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 1265.
75. Id. (quoting the district court's unpublished decision).
76. See 50 F.3d at 1263-66.
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geon-patient exposure is virtually non-existent." Thus, the codirt re-
jected the express language of Arline and chose to re-define the test by
giving less weight to the probability of transmission. The court con-
cluded that if transmission from surgeon to patient was "possible," the
HIV-positive surgeon posed a significant risk to the health and safety
of his patients that could not be reasonably accommodated.78
In Bradley v. University of Texas MD. Anderson Cancer Center,
7 9
the Fifth Circuit determined that an HIV-positive surgical technician
posed a significant risk to patients and thus, was disqualified from
statutory disability protection.80 In reaching this decision, the Bradley
court stressed the "catastrophic consequences" of the transmission of
HIV from a surgical technician to a patient and minimized the low
probability of transmission.81 Thus, the court tipped the balance of the
Arline test to weigh against the significance of the fourth prong. The
court concluded that it would be impossible for the hospital to elimi-
nate the risk of transmission associated with the surgical technician's
job through reasonable accommodation. 82 The court held that an ac-
commodation to eliminate the risk of transmission would be tanta-
mount to an elimination of the "essential functions" of the job, and
therefore, not reasonable.
83
Another controversial case arose in Scoles v. Mercy Health Corpo-
ration.84 In Scoles, an HIV-positive orthopedic surgeon sued his hos-
pital-employer for violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.
He. claimed that the hospital prohibited him from performing surgery
without first obtaining informed consent from his patients, including
disclosure of his HIV status.85
The issue for the court was whether the surgeon posed a direct
77. See id.
78. See id. at 1266.
79. 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993).
80. See id. at 924-25.
81. See id. at 924.
82. See id. at 925. A surgical technician's job includes handing the han-
dles of instruments to surgeons while holding the sharp end. See id. at 924.
This task usually takes place within inches of open wounds, and sometimes re-
quires placing a hand inside the body cavity. See id.
83. See id. at 925.
84. 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Penn. 1994). The case was settled prior to a
decision by the appellate court.
85. See id. at 766-68.
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threat, or significant risk to patients, falling outside of the requirements
for statutory protection under both statutes.8 6 In its analysis, the court
placed heavy emphasis on the severity of the risk involved with an
HIV-positive surgeon while severely discounting the surgeon's argu-
ments that the risk of transmission was very lOW.8 7 The court essen-
tially decided that because no one was sure of the extent of the risk of
transmission, it would not place much weight on that factor. The court
concluded, as a matter of law, that an HIV-positive HCW, who per-
forms invasive surgical procedures, is not qualified for protection un-
der either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.
88
Finally, the most recent case, and perhaps the most poignant exam-
ple of a re-weighing of the Arline factors, is Estate of Mauro v. Bor-
gess Medical Center.89 In Mauro, the defendant-hospital fired the
plaintiff from his position as a surgical technician after the hospital
learned he was HIV-positive. 90 The plaintiff alleged that in so doing,
the hospital violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by discrimi-
nating against him because of his disability. 9' The hospital argued that
the plaintiff could not be reasonably accommodated in his job due to
the direct threat/significant risk posed to patients by the plaintiff, and
therefore, the decision to fire him did not violate the protection of ei-
ther Act.92
In its analysis, the court noted that the first three factors of the Ar-
line test all addressed the risk of HIV transmission should the surgical
technician bleed while inside a body cavity.93 The court then analyzed,
in great detail, the evidence regarding the probability of transmission
between the plaintiff and a patient.94 The court considered the plain-
tiffs job description and how the job was generally carried out in
practice.95 The evidence established that without accommodation for
his HIV status, the plaintiffs position would create the possibility that
86. See id. at 767-68.
87. See id. at 771-72.
88. See id. at 772.
89. 137 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998).
90. See id. at 400-01.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 401.
93. See id. at 403.
94. See 137 F.3d at 403-06.
95. See id.
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he could bleed into a patient during surgery. 96 Even though no ac-
commodation was suggested, and the credible medical evidence
downplayed the risk of transmission and highlighted the possibility of
accommodation, the court concluded that the plaintiff was a direct
threat/significant risk to patients. 97 With this ruling, the court effec-
tively held that HIV-positive surgical HCWs are "not otherwise quali-
fied as a matter of law."98
The dissent in this case fundamentally questioned the majority's
use of the Arline test, emphasizing that the transmissibility factor was
not given due consideration." The court noted that while it was "not
ontologically impossible for [the plaintiff] to transmit" the deadly dis-
ease, "the chance that he [would] do so to any given patient" was very
small. 00 The dissent carefully reviewed the medical evidence avail-
able regarding the transmission of HIV by surgical personnel, and
concluded that under Arline, a court must consider transmissibility in
determining whether an individual poses a significant risk/direct
threat.' 0' Because the medical evidence established that the probability
of transmission was so low, the dissent concluded that Arline essen-
tially prohibited the majority's finding that HIV-positive surgical
HCWs were a significant risk ordirect threat as a matter of law.'0 2 The
dissent argued the issues of significant risk and reasonable accommo-
dation were jury questions, the solution preferred by the Arline court's




97. See id at 406-07.
98. Id. at 413 (Boggs, C.J., dissenting) (stating holding of the majority).
99. See 137 F.3d at 407-08.
100.1d. at 408 ("Whether we call the risk 'extremely small,' 'vanishingly
small,' 'negligible,' or whatever, assessing the risk remains a judgment that
must be made by considering both the actual probability of harm and the de-
gree of the consequences, just as the Supreme Court [in Arline] instructed
US.").
101. See id, at 409-16.
102. See id. at 413 (concluding that the majority "misapplied the standard
found in Arline, and ignored relevant principles of risk observed by statisti-
cians and by lay people").
103. See id at 411; see also Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers,
84 F.3d 758, 764 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Whether one is a direct threat [or poses a
significant risk] is a complicated, fact intensive determination, not a question
of law.").
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Other courts are also in accord with the general analysis expounded
by the Doe, Bradley, Scoles, and Mauro courts. 104 These courts all de-
emphasize the fourth factor of the Arline test relating to the risk of
transmission of HIV in the surgical environment and instead focus on
the nature of the disease itself.
4. Re-Balancing the Arline Test? The Supreme Court's Decision in
Bragdon v. Abbott
In Bragdon v. Abbott, 0 5 the Supreme Court addressed the question
of whether an HIV-positive dental patient, who requested that a dentist
perform an invasive dental procedure, posed a direct threat to the
health and safety of the dentist and was not qualified for protection
under the ADA. 10 6 The Court began its analysis by noting that the
ADA's definition of direct threat codifies the language and considera-
tions employed by the four Arline factors. 10 7 The Court held that for an
individual to pose a direct threat to others, and thus not be qualified
under the ADA, that individual must present a significant risk.'08 The
Court intimated that the determination of whether the risk was signifi-
cant necessitated a careful weighing of all the Arline factors.'0 9 Indeed,
after briefly noting the risk with an invasive procedure involving an
HIV-positive patient, the court focused on the fourth prong of the Ar-
line test and evaluated whether the risk of transmissibility was enough
to conclude that the plaintiff-patient constituted a significant
risk/direct threat." 10
The defendant-dentist presented several studies evaluating the risk
of transmissibility of JIV in invasive dental procedures."' These
104. See, e.g., Doe v. Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628, 632-34 (E.D.
Mo. 1991) (concluding that an HIV-positive dental student was not otherwise
qualified to perform invasive procedures because of the significant risk to pa-
tients); cf Estate of Behringer v. Medical Cir., 592 A.2d 1251, 1276-77 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (finding no violation of state statute proscribing
discrimination against the disabled because an HIV-positive surgeon-plaintiff
posed a "reasonable probability of substantial harm" to others).
105. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
106. See id. at 2209-10.
107. See id. at 2210.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See 118 S.Ct. at 2210-12.
111. Seeid, at 2212.
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studies showed that HIV could be transmitted by invasive dental pro-
cedures," 2 yet, the Court, rejected these studies as being inconclusive
and unpersuasive. 1 3 Absent a showing of transmissibility implicating
a significant risk to the defendant, the Court refused to classify the
HIV-positive patient as being a direct threat or significant risk to the
dentist in the performance of invasive dental procedures."
4
The Bragdon Court rejected arguments that solely because of the
severity of the disease, an HIV-positive individual is automatically a
direct threat/significant risk when involved in an invasive medical
procedure. The Court placed a balanced emphasis on the risk of
transmission prong of the Arline test. In so doing, the Court concluded
that even though the severity of the risk to the dentist in performing
invasive procedures was high, when balanced with the virtually non-
existent evidence of transmissibility, the risk was not "significant" un-
der the Arline test. Arguably, this case emphasizes the Court's desire
to re-focus the analysis of direct threat or significant risk on the fac-
tors originally delineated by Arline. Such an analysis will require that,
when deciding a case involving an invasive medical procedure and an
HIV-positive patient or HCW, the Court will place proper emphasis
on the risk of transmission of HIV and not merely focus on the sever-
ity of the risk. Indeed, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are about
compensating and allowing for the taking of reasonable risks. 15 Such
risks are inherently necessary to provide an effective remedy against
discrimination of disabled Americans.
B. CDC Guidance in Determining the Risks and
Accommodations Possible With HIV-Positive Surgical
HCWs
According to the Supreme Court, not only must courts apply all




115. See, e.g., 118 S.Ct. at 2210 (noting that risk-taking is a part of the
ADA and necessary to provide an effective remedy against discrimination);
Estate of Mauro, 137 F.3d at 407 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs, C.J., dissenting)
("The ADA thus requires employers to employ people they would rather not
employ, and by whom they believe, rightly or wrongly, their patients would
prefer not to be ministered to.").
1999]
142 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 16:127"
individual is significant, but that the evaluation of risk must be based
on objectively sound medical evidence.' 1 6 Even a good-faith belief that
a conclusion regarding the risk of an HIV-positive employee is sound
is not enough.'17 Rather, employers must make determinations of the
risk posed by the employee based upon a standard of objective reason-
ableness of the medical evidence and data." 8 The Supreme Court also
made clear that the reasonableness of an employer's determination re-
garding the risk posed by an employee will be judged against the stan-
dards and views set forth by "public health authorities, such as the
CDC. ,, 119
As of 1995, no documented case exists of an HIV-positive surgeon
transmitting the virus to a patient. 20 Indeed, the CDC estimates that
the risk that a single patient might contract the virus from an HIV-
positive surgeon ranges from .0024 percent (1 in 42,000) to .00024
percent (1 in 417,000). 121 However, the CDC estimates that the cumu-
lative risk of transmission by an HIV-positive surgeon during the
course of his career ranges from .8 percent to 8.1 percent.
22
In light of the low risk of transmissibility between an HIV-positive
surgical HCW and a patient, the CDC recommendeds that HIV-
positive surgical HCWs be allowed to perform most surgical proce-
dures. 123 The CDC concludes that strict adherence to "universal pre-
116. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2210.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Id. (citing School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288
(1987)). The Supreme Court went on to note that the views of public health
authorities are not conclusive and can be refuted by "citing a credible scien-
tific basis for deviating from the accepted norm." Id (citation omitted).
120. See University of Md. Med Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1263 n.5 (citing
Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Recom-
mendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus
and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures,
40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1, 3-4 (July 12, 1991) [herein-
after CDC Recommendations].
121. See id. at 1263 (citing CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEPT.
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OPEN MEETING ON THE RISKS OF
TRANSMISSION OF BLOOD-BORNE PATHOGENS TO PATIENTS DURING INVASIVE
PROCEDURES (Feb. 21-22, 1991)).
122. See id.
123. See CDC Recommendations, supra note 120, at 5.
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cautions" should be sufficient for effective infection control. 24 If uni-
versal precautions are followed, the CDC reasons that "[c]urrently
available data provide no basis for recommendations to restrict the
practice of HCWs infected with HIV ... who perform invasive proce-
dures."'
125
The CDC recommendations did not stop with simply stating agen-
eral rule that HIV-positive surgical HCWs can continue working if
universal precautions were followed. Rather, the CDC distinguishes
between invasive procedures (including most surgical procedures) and
a more limited class of what the CDC terms "exposure-prone" proce-
dures. 26 Exposure-prone procedures are those that create a greater risk
of injuring the surgical HCW through a skin pierce.127 While not
specifying which medical procedures would qualify as exposure-
prone, the CDC does provide a statement of general guidance:
Characteristics of exposure-prone procedures include
digital palpitation of a needle tip in a body cavity or the
simultaneous presence of the HCWs fingers and a nee-
dle or other sharp instrument or object in a poorly visu-
alized or highly confined anatomic site. Performance of
exposure-prone procedures presents a recognized risk
of percutaneous injury to the HCW, and if such an in-
jury occurs the HCWs blood is likely to contact the pa-
tient's body cavity, subcutaneous tissues, and/or mu-
cous membranes.1
8
The CDC leaves to health care employers a substantial portion of
the decision making as to whether procedures performed at their facil-
ity are "exposure-prone" and under what circumstances, if any, can
HIV-positive surgical HCWs perform such procedures. 29 It is clear,
however, from the language of the CDC's recommendations, that sim-
ply because a procedure is invasive, it is not necessarily exposure-
prone. 30 Indeed, the CDC seems to almost suggest that an invasive
procedure is presumed not to be exposure-prone unless it meets the
124. See id. Universal precautions include hand-washing, wearing protec-
tive gloves and masks, and the exercise of care in using sharp instruments such




128. CDC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 120, at 4.
129. See id. at 5.
130. See id. at 3-5.
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definition.'
31
C. Direct Threat/Significant Risk and Reasonable
Accommodation
In the analysis of direct threat or significant risk involving an HIV-
positive surgical HCW, if the risk of transmission can be reasonably
accommodated, no direct threat exists.132 Thus, under the CDC's
guidelines regarding HIV-positive surgical HCWs, universal precau-
tions should be a sufficient reasonable accommodation in virtually all
circumstances.133 However, even with the precautionary language of
the CDC, courts addressing the issue of whether a reasonable accom-
modation can be made for an HIV-positive surgical HCW have con-
cluded in the negative. 34 Such a conclusion is arguably contradictory
to the Supreme Court's admonition that courts defer to the guidance of
health care authorities, such as the CDC, and focuses on the severity
of the risk of HIV while disregarding the actual risk of transmission.
Courts addressing the issue of direct threat or significant risk of an
HIV-positive surgical HCW largely ignore the general invasive and
exposure-prone distinction suggested by the CDC. 35 Even those courts
that discuss the distinction universally defer to the hospital-
defendant's ultimate determination regarding the significance of the
risk and whether reasonable accommodations can be made. 3 6 In al-
most all of these cases, the reasonable accommodation offered by the
hospitals was for the HIV-positive surgical HCW to discontinue
working in the invasive surgical environment. 137 Rather, the hospitals
typically either fired the HIV-positive surgical HCW, or offered that
131. See id.
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1994). Indeed, this statutory language of
the ADA, meant to incorporate the Arline factors, expressly provides for the
balance of all the factors, including transmission. See id.; see also 28 C.F.R. §
36.208 (1998).
133. See supra Part II.B.
134. It should be noted that the Supreme,Court in Bragdon concluded that
the CDC recommendations involving the use of universal precautions with in-
vasive dental surgery do not "assess the level of risk" involved. See Bragdon,
118 S.Ct. at 2211 (1998). Rather, these recommendations, in the Court's view,
set out "the best way to combat the risk of HIV transmission." Id.
135. See, e.g., Scoles, 887 F. Supp. at 768-69.
136. See supra notes 80-99 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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person an administrative position.1 38 While some courts allowed an
HIV-positive surgical HCW to work on a patient with informed con-
sent, 139 most did not address this issue. 40 No attempt was made by any
of these courts to ascertain whether, as a reasonable accommodation,
the surgical HCW could perform the large class of invasive procedures
identified by the CDC as not posing a significant risk to the patient.'
4'
The failure by these courts to assess the significance of the risk based
upon the CDC's recommendations to find reasonable accommodations
is congruent with their failure to give proper consideration to all four
Arline factors, including risk of transmission.
42
III. CONCLUSION
Health care facilities that employ HIV-positive surgical HCWs face
an unenviable dilemma. If they retain the HIV-positive HCW, they
face the potential for major legal, social, and moral liability to a pa-
tient who may become infected by the employee. On the other hand, if
the health care facility simply discharges the employee or fails to offer
reasonable accommodation, the facility faces potential liability from
the employee who brings an action under the ADA and/or the Reha-
bilitation Act. While the courts addressing this issue tend to categori-
cally defer to the employer's decision to dismiss the HIV-positive sur-
gical HCW
and/or the employer's failure to offer the HCW accommodation,
the Supreme Court appears to have compassed the analysis back to its
original heading. Under this analysis, courts should carefully consider
not only the severity of HIV when determining if an HIV-positive sur-
gical HCW is a direct threat or significant risk, but also should con-
sider the actual risk of transmission based upon those factors outlined
by the CDC. In the final analysis, however, the HIV-positive surgical
138. See, e.g., supra note 137 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Scoles, 887 F. Supp. at 765.
140. See, e.g., supra note 137 and accompanying text. Of course, the
plaintiff in Scoles argued that even informed consent was not reasonable, as it
eliminated his patient list. Scoles, 887 F. Supp. at 767.
141. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. As the courts did not
address alternative avenues of reasonable accommodation, they did not reach
the reasonable accommodation/undue hardship balancing noted previously.
See supra notes 30-33 (noting factors for determining whether undue hardship
exists).
142. See supra Part II.A.
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HCW faces a difficult battle as health care facilities and courts must
remember the Hippocratic maxim to "first, do no harm" in their at-
tempt to protect both the patient and the HIV-positive surgical HCW.
